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Abstract
The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly
incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in
period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical
core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the
core of the economy where executed asset contracts serve as initial
endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical
core when all possible state-contingent contracts may serve as an asset.
For nance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is
generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside
the setting of nance economies, we show that the strong sequential
core can be empty even if there is a complete set of assets. If the set
of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is
enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents' consumption
sets, then a complete set of assets is sucient for the equivalence of
the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.

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1 Introduction
The usual implicit assumption for a cooperative solution concept like the
core is that the agents can write binding contracts on outcomes provided by
that concept. In a static situation like a one-shot cooperative game or an
exchange economy it is not essential whether a core allocation is regarded as
a candidate for a binding contract or whether it is directly interpreted as one.
Agreeing on such an allocation is equivalent to carrying it out since nothing
happens in between. This is radically dierent in a dynamic situation, even
in the case of complete certainty. Agents or coalitions might change their
minds after an originally agreed upon contract has partially been carried
out, because it might no longer be in their best interest to stick to it. In the
case of uncertainty, where information becomes available over time, this is
even more likely to occur.
In this paper we consider the case of a two-period exchange economy
under uncertainty. In period zero there is trade in assets, of which the pay-
os depend on the future, unknown, state of the world. In period one the
uncertainty is resolved, asset contracts are executed and on this basis trade
in commodities takes place. In the ex ante or classical core as in Aumann
(1961), coalitions consider the allocations that they can achieve in each state
of nature by pooling their endowments, and compute their ex ante utilities
over these allocations. A classical core allocation consists of a bundle of goods
for each agent in each state of nature such that no coalition can improve ex
ante. In this notion asset trading does not play a role since in any state of
nature any redistribution of the initial endowments is agreed upon ex ante
and is compatible with any trade in assets in period zero.
The classical core concept, however, fails to take into account that agents
can reconsider their positions in the subeconomy at period one after reso-
lution of the uncertainty. Then asset trading becomes important since it
determines the initial positions in each state of nature. Coalitions might be
able to improve upon the initial classical core allocation ex post. A classical
core allocation might not be self-enforcing once the state of nature in period
one is known. Similar point of views have been taken in Gale (1978), Repullo
(1988), and Koutsougeras (1998), who discuss sequential core concepts, and
Kranich et al. (2000), who study multi-period models where at each period
the agents face a cooperative game, but there is no uncertainty.
To capture the implications of self-enforcement, we impose on top of the
conditions of the classical core, the requirement that in each state of nature
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the resulting allocation is in the core of the subeconomy in which executed
asset contracts serve as initial endowments. In this natural way the dynamic
nature of the economy is taken into account and a renement of the classical
core is obtained. This renement is called the strong sequential core, and it
is the central topic of this paper.
When each possible contingent contract may serve as an asset, i.e. there
is an asset for each commodity contingent on each state of nature, the strong
sequential core coincides with the classical core. Indeed, it is possible to
implement the classical core allocation directly by an appropriate trade in
assets in period zero. Retrading in period one cannot lead to improvements
by denition of the classical core.
In general, standard assumptions cannot guarantee non-emptiness of the
strong sequential core. For the special case of nance economies, i.e. one
good is traded at each state of nature, the sharper result was obtained that
the strong sequential core is empty for any choice of the initial endowments
in the set of full measure, if the number of the states of nature exceeds the
number of assets by at least two.
An obvious question is whether equivalence with the classical core is still
obtained if there is only a complete set of assets in the sense of Arrow (1953).
The surprising answer is that not only equivalence may fail to hold, but even
that the strong sequential core may be empty. We show that this is partially
due to the requirement, implicit in the denition of the strong sequential
core, that the endowments in the subeconomies resulting from asset trading
in period zero, must be in the consumption sets of the agents.
We also dene the so-called semi-strong sequential core. In that denition
it is no longer required that the endowments at the beginning of period one
belong to the consumption sets of the agents. We show that when there
is a complete set of assets, then equivalence of the classical core and the
semi-strong sequential core obtains.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 species the model
and some preliminaries, and Section 3 denes the strong sequential core. Sec-
tion 4 considers the special case of nance economies and Section 5 treats the
general multiple commodity case. Section 6 denes the semi-strong sequen-
tial core and states our equivalence result. Section 7 concludes. The more
involved proofs are collected in the Appendix.
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2 The Model and Preliminaries
2.1 The Model
We consider an economy with two time periods (t = 0; t = 1) and uncertainty
concerning period one. Uncertainty is modelled as a nite set f1; : : : ; Sg of
states of nature with given probabilities 
s
> 0; s = 1; : : : ; S of occurrence.
Period t = 0 is identied with state s = 0.
There is a set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents. Agents trade in J assets in
period 0 and, conditional on the realization of the state of nature s; in L
commodities in period 1. In state of nature s = 1; : : : ; S; agent i has a
consumption set X
i
s
 R
L
; so the consumption set of agent i is given by
X
i
=
Q
S
s=1
X
i
s
: We denote X =
Q
i2N
X
i
: An agent i is further characterized
by his vector of initial endowments in state of nature s; !
i
s
2 X
i
s
; and his
elementary (Bernoulli) utility function u
i
s
: X
i
s
! R: Agents are expected
utility maximizers, with v
i
: X
i
! R the expected utility function dened
by v
i
(x
i
) =
P
S
s=1

s
u
i
s
(x
i
s
):
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The matrix of asset payos is given by the SLJ matrix A: The generic
entry A
j
s;l
of the matrix A species the quantity of commodity l paid by asset
j in state of nature s.
These components together dene our economy, denoted by E . We shall
often parametrize economies by the agents' endowments !. A typical element
of this family is denoted by E
!
.
The institutional set-up of the economy is as follows.
1. In period 0, trade in assets takes place. Alternatively, one may think
of these trades taking the form of state-contingent contracts. There are
no endowments and therefore no consumption in period t = 0.
2. Nature randomly chooses the state of nature. The execution of asset
contracts takes place and results in an allocation x:
3. In period 1, trade in commodities takes place. Agents treat allocation
x as their initial endowments. Trade in commodities results in an
allocation y of commodities, which is consumed.
Notice that the institutional setting is one of dynamic exchange without
the formation of prices. Our analysis is therefore complementary to the
1
The assumption of the expected utility is adopted for simplicity, but it is not crucial.
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extensive literature on constrained suboptimality of competitive equilibria
when asset markets are incomplete, which originates from the contribution
of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
An important role in our analysis is played by the set of constrained
feasible allocations:
A =
n
x 2 X





X
i2N
x
i
=
X
i2N
!
i
; x
i
  !
i
2 hAi
o
;
where hAi denotes the linear space spanned by the columns of A, i.e., the
span of A. This is the set of allocations that can be achieved by trade in
assets in period 0. If there are no assets, then we dene A = f!g. The set of
allocations that are constrained feasible under the initial endowments ! will
also be denoted by A
!
.
2.2 Ex ante and ex post economies.
The dynamic structure of the economy E allows for the identication of a
number of subeconomies.
The ex ante economy, i.e. the one that precedes the resolution of uncer-
tainty, may be associated with state of nature 0. This is the economy with
commodity space R
SL
, consumption sets X
i
, expected utility functions v
i
,
and initial endowments !
i
. It is denoted by E
0
. Formally,
E
0
= E(N;R
SL
; hX
i
; v
i
; !
i
i
i2N
):
The classical core of the economy E
0
is denoted by C(E
0
), hence
C(E
0
) = fx 2 X j
P
i2N
x
i
=
P
i2N
!
i
there are no T  N and y 2
Q
i2T
X
i
such that
P
i2T
y
i
=
P
i2T
!
i
and v
i
(y
i
) > v
i
(x
i
) for all i 2 Tg:
Any constrained feasible allocation x gives rise to exactly S ex post sube-
conomies, one in each of the possible states of nature, following the reso-
lution of uncertainty. The economy associated with state of nature s has
commodity space R
L
, consumption sets X
i
s
, utility functions u
i
s
, and initial
endowments x
i
s
. It is denoted by E
s;x
. Formally,
E
s;x
= E(N;R
L
; hX
i
s
; u
i
s
; x
i
s
i
i2N
):
The classical core of the economy E
s;x
is denoted by C(E
s;x
):
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2.3 Example
Throughout the paper we exploit the following example. Consider the family
of economies, parameterized by the agents' endowments ! 2 
 = R
nSL
++
, in
which n = 2 and both agents have identical consumption sets and utility
functions given by:
X
i
s
= R
L
++
; (1)
u
i
s
(y
i
s
) =
L
X
l=1
ln(y
i
sl
); y
i
s
2 R
L
++
; (2)
v
i
(y
i
) =
S
X
s=1
(1=S)
L
X
l=1
ln(y
i
sl
); y
i
2 R
SL
++
: (3)
Note the implicit assumption that all states are equally likely. Let the initial
endowments ! 2 
 and the constrained feasible allocation x 2 A
!
be given.
Dene the numbers

i
s
(x) =
 
L
Y
l=1
x
i
sl
=x

sl
!
1=L

i
0
(x) =
 
S
Y
s=1
L
Y
l=1
x
i
sl
=x

sl
!
1=SL
where x

= x
1
+ x
2
. Then
P(E
0;!
) =
n
y 2 R
nSL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
= t
i
!

; t
1
+ t
2
= 1
o
(4)
is the set of Pareto optimal allocations and
C(E
0;!
) =
n
y 2 R
nSL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
= t
i
!

; t
1
+ t
2
= 1; t
i
 
i
0
(!)
o
(5)
C(E
s;x
) =
n
y
s
2 R
nL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
s
= t
i
!

s
; t
1
+ t
2
= 1; t
i
 
i
s
(x)
o
(6)
are the classical cores of the subeconomies at states s = 0; 1; : : : ; S. These
expressions will be helpful in expressing the strong (and the semi-strong)
sequential core for the economy E
!
:
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3 The Strong Sequential Core
We start with an example that suggests the role one may assign to assets in
a dynamic economy.
3.1 Example
Consider the economy of Section 2.3 with two commodities and two states of
nature. The two agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions
dened in (1){(3). The initial endowments are

!
1
!
2

=

1   1    
  1   1  

;
where the rst two columns correspond to s = 1 and the last two to s = 2.
Consider the allocation y given by

y
1
y
2

=

1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2
1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2

:
In period t = 0 there are no protable deviations from y: It cannot be
improved upon by the grand coalition and gives both agents higher expected
utility than their initial endowments. Hence, y may well be agreed upon at
the outset.
Assume for a moment that there are no assets traded in period t = 0.
Then agents begin the exchange game in period t = 1 having their initial
endowments !. Suppose that the state of the world s = 1 has realized. To
achieve allocation y
1
, agreed upon earlier in the game, agent 1 must give agent
2 positive amounts of both commodities. However, once the state of nature
is known, this exchange is no longer individually rational. The denition of
the strong sequential core takes these considerations into account, and rules
out such allocations.
Now suppose that there is an asset, of which the payos are given by the
vector
A = (1; 0; 1; 0):
This asset pays one unit of commodity l = 1 in state of nature s = 1 and
minus one unit of the same commodity in state of nature s = 2. The following
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exchange may then be arranged in period zero: agent 1 gives 1  2 units of
the asset to agent 2. This asset trade would result in an allocation

x
1
x
2

=

 1   1   
1     1  

2 A:
Suppose, as before, that state s = 1 has realized. In the trade that follows
execution of contracts it would then be individually rational for both agents
to exchange x
1
for y
1
. The same is true for the second state of nature. In
this way trade in assets in period t = 0 may prevent agents from deviating in
subsequent periods. Indeed, the allocation y will turn out to be an element
of the strong sequential core in this example.
3.2 Denition of the Strong Sequential Core
Denition 1 An allocation y 2 X is an element of the strong sequential
core of the economy E , denoted by SSC(E), if
1. y 2 C(E
0
);
2. there exists x 2 A such that y
s
2 C(E
s;x
) for all s = 1; : : : S:
Point 1 of the denition requires that there are no deviations from y in period
t = 0. Point 2 guarantees that there are no deviations in the subsequent
period, given the appropriate asset trades arranged at the outset.
In the absence of asset markets the possibilities for the grand coalition
are fairly limited. Its choice of allocations is restricted to the cores of the
rst-period economies that originate from the initial endowments, C(E
s;!
).
However, when there are assets in the economy, the grand coalition can
support dierent allocations by redistributing assets among its members in
period zero. We may think of the grand coalition as redistributing assets in
period t = 0 of the economy in order to prevent subcoalitions from deviating
in the subsequent period.
Note that the strong sequential core increases when the set of constrained
feasible allocations increases. If, in particular, A has rank SL; then every
classical core allocation can be sustained as an allocation in the strong se-
quential core. Indeed, any classical core allocation can be achieved directly
by an appropriate trade in assets. At the arrival of period 1, contracts are
executed, and no retrading of commodities is needed. Summarizing:
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Theorem 1 If the set of assets traded in an economy expands, the strong
sequential core weakly increases. If A has rank SL; then SSC(E) = C(E
0
).
An important case where the rank of A is SL is the one where for each
commodity contingent on each state, there is a contract specifying its delivery
in period 1. This corresponds to the complete market structure as analyzed
in traditional general equilibrium theory. Nevertheless, the requirement that
the rank of A equals SL is very demanding. The next two sections consider
the more interesting case where some assets are missing.
4 Finance Economies
We start out with the special case of nance economies. In a nance economy
there is just one commodity in each state of nature (L = 1). We assume that
X
i
s
= R
+
. If the utility functions are strongly monotone, then for any x 2 A
and s = 1; : : : ; S;
C(E
s;x
) = fx
s
g:
This implies that the strong sequential core is given by
SSC(E) = A \ C(E
0
):
We make the following standard assumptions on the utility functions.
Assumption U
1. v
i
: R
S
+
! R is continuous on R
S
+
and twice continuously dierentiable
on R
S
++
.
2. For any x
i
2 R
S
++
; rv
i
(x
i
) 2 R
S
++
:
3. For any x
i
2 R
S
++
,
n
y
i
2 R
S
+
j v
i
(y
i
)  v
i
(x
i
)
o
 R
S
++
.
4. Indierence curves have non-zero Gaussian curvature:

x
i
2 R
S
++
; h 2 R
S
; h 6= 0; h
T
rv
i
(x
i
) = 0

implies

h
T
r
2
v
i
(x
i
)h < 0

.
The proof of the following result is given in the Appendix A.1.
Theorem 2 Let E
!
be a family of nance economies parameterized by the
agent's initial endowments ! 2 
 = R
Sn
++
: Suppose that n  2, all v
i
satisfy
assumption U , and rank(A) = J.
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1. If J < S   1, then there exists a set of full measure 


 
 such that
for all ! 2 


SSC(E
!
) = ;:
2. If J = S   1, then there exists a set of full measure 


 
 such that
for all ! 2 


SSC(E
!
) is either empty or nite:
The statement 2 of the theorem 2 cannot be strengthened in either direction.
More precisely, when J = S   1, then there may exist two complemen-
tary subsets 
 and 
 of 
, both with non-empty interiors, such that for all
economies in the set 
 the strong sequential core is non-empty, and for all
those in the set 
 the strong sequential core is empty. This is demonstrated
by the following example.
Example 1 Consider the following family of nance economies E
!
parame-
terized by the agents' endowments ! 2 
 = R
nS
++
. We assume that S  3,
n = 2 and the agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions
dened by (1){(3). The S  (S   1) matrix of asset payos is given by
A =
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
1 0    0
0 1    0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0    1
0 0    0
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
The set of Pareto-ecient allocations and the core of the economy E
0;!
are
dened in (4) and (5). Then
SSC(E
!
) = C(E
0;!
) \ A
 P(E
0;!
) \ A =
n
t
1
(!)!

; t
2
(!)!

o
; (7)
where t
i
(!) = !
i
S
=!

S
, the fraction of the total endowment in state S owned
by agent i:
The strong sequential core of the economy E
!
is therefore either an empty
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set or a single-element set dened by (7). It is a single-element set if the
allocation dened by (7) is individually rational, and it is empty otherwise:
SSC(E
!
) =
(
n
t
1
(!)!

; t
2
(!)!

o
if t
i
(!)  
i
0
(!) for i = 1; 2
; otherwise:
Dene 
  
 to be the set of initial allocations ! 2 
 satisfying
t
i
(!)  
i
0
(!); i = 1; 2; (8)
and let 
 be its complement in 
.
It remains to show that both sets have non-empty interiors. Whenever
S  3, an allocation

!
1
!
2

=

S 1 1 : : : 1 1
1 S 1 : : : 1 1

satises condition (8) with strict inequalities for both agent 1 and agent 2.
Hence, it lies in the interior of 
. In contrast, allocation

!
1
!
2

=

S S S : : : S 1
1 1 1 : : : 1 S

is such that t
1
(!) < 
1
0
(!). Hence, it is an interior point of the set 
.
5 The Multiple Commodities Case
Let the number of commodities be arbitrary, L  1. The rst observation is
that Theorem 1 cannot be extended to economies with multiple goods. When
L > 1, then, irrespective of the number of assets, there exist robust examples
of economies with a non-empty strong sequential core. That is, there is a
subset 
  
 with non-empty interior, such that for all economies in 
 the
strong sequential core is non-empty. Such an example is the following one.
Example 2 (Robust existence of the strong sequential core) We con-
sider the family of economies E
!
parameterized by the agents' endowments
! 2 
 = R
nSL
++
. We assume that L  2, n = 2 and that the agents have
identical consumption sets and utility functions dened by (1){(3). Assume
that there are no assets.
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The cores for the economies E
0;!
and E
s;!
are given by (5) and (6). The
strong sequential core of the economy E
!
without assets is
SSC(E
!
) =
n
y 2 R
nSL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
= t
i
!

; t
1
+ t
2
= 1; t
i
 
i
0
(!)
t
i
 
i
s
(!); s = 1; : : : ; S
o
:
It is non-empty if and only if the following condition is satised:
There are no s; s
0
2 f0; 1; : : : ; Sg; s 6= s
0
; such that (9)

1
s
(!) + 
2
s
0
(!) > 1:
If this condition is not satised, then the requirement of individual rationality
for agent 1 in state of nature s is not compatible with the one for agent 2 in
the state s
0
. Let 
 be the set of initial allocations ! 2 
 satisfying condition
(9). The allocation

!
1
s
!
2
s

=

1  1 : : : 1
 1 1 : : : 1

; s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg;
for  < 1; is such that for all s; s
0
2 f0; 1; : : : ; Sg; s 6= s
0
, the strict inequalities

1
s
(!) + 
2
s
0
(!) < 1:
hold true. Therefore, this allocation is an interior point of the set 
.
We conclude that for all economies in the set 
 the strong sequential
core is non-empty. Due to Theorem 1, we can augment the economy by any
number of assets while preserving the robust non-emptiness of the strong
sequential core.
It has already been noted (Theorem 1) that the strong sequential core weakly
increases in the rank of matrix A and that it coincides with C(E
0
) when the
rank of A reaches SL. In the remainder of this section we explore the case
of a strongly complete set of assets, by which we mean the following.
Denition 2 For any vector p 2 R
SL
; let p A be the S  J-dimensional
matrix with rows p
s
A
s
, s = 1; : : : ; S. The set of assets is said to be strongly
complete, if for every p 2 R
SL
++
rank(p A) = S:
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In particular, this `box-product condition' implies that the rank of matrix A
is not less than S. Under this assumption of strong completeness, nancial
markets equilibria exist, coincide with equilibria in the complete markets
model, and are therefore Pareto-ecient, see Arrow (1953).
There are at least two reasons why one might conjecture that under strong
completeness the strong sequential core is non-empty, and in fact equal to the
classical core. The rst intuition is based on the case of nance economies,
where strong completeness is equivalent to the requirement that the rank of
A be S: We have already shown that in the setting of nance economies the
strong sequential core is equal to classical core when this rank condition holds.
The second intuition comes indeed from the above mentioned equivalence
between the complete markets model and an economy as described in Arrow
(1953) with a sequential structure, but a complete set of Arrow securities.
Note also that Theorem 1 states equivalence to the classical core when the
rank of A equals LS:
It turns out, however, that such a conjecture is false. Not only is there no
equivalence to the classical core. The strong sequential core might even be
empty when L  2 and the set of assets is strongly complete. A reason for
the emptiness of the strong sequential core is found in the denition of A, the
set of constrained feasible allocations. The requirement that a constrained
feasible allocation x should lie in a consumption set may cause the strong
sequential core to be empty, even when there is a strongly complete set of
assets. This is illustrated in the following example, and elaborated in the
next section, where we consider the semi-strong sequential core.
Example 3 (Non-existence for a strongly complete set of assets) Consider
the family of economies parameterized by the agents' endowments ! 2 
 =
R
nSL
++
, in which n = 2 and the consumption sets and utility functions are as
in (1){(3). We specify only the last L+ 1 rows of the asset matrix A:
A
S 1;L
= f0; : : : ; 0; 1g
A
S;l
= f0; : : : ; 0; 0g for l = 1; : : : ; L  1
A
S;L
= f0; : : : ; 0; 1g:
The other entries of the matrix may be chosen arbitrarily. This implies that
the rank of A does not exceed SL   L. Note, however, that the case of a
strongly complete set of assets is not excluded. For instance, if S = 3 and
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L = 2, then the matrix
A =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
has the required structure and satises the box-product condition.
We claim that all economies in some open subset of 
 have an empty
strong sequential core.
The classical cores of the economies E
0;!
and E
s;x
are given by (5) and
(6). The strong sequential core of the economy E
!
is the set
SSC(E
!
) =
n
y 2 R
nSL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
= t
i
!

; t
1
+ t
2
= 1; t
i
 
i
0
(!)
9x 2 A
!
such that t
i
 
i
s
(x); s = 1; : : : ; S
o
:
Take any ! 2 
 that satises the following inequalities
!
1
S;L
  !
1
S 1;L
> 0
 
(!
1
S;L
  !
1
S 1;L
)=!
1
S;L

1=L

1
S
(!) + 
2
0
(!) > 1;
and any x 2 A
!
. There exists a scalar  (agent 1's net trade in asset J) such
that
x
1
S 1;L
= !
1
S 1;L
+ 
x
1
S;l
= !
1
S;l
; l = 1; : : : ; L  1
x
1
S;L
= !
1
S;L
+ :
From the positivity constraint x
1
S 1;L
> 0 it follows that  >  !
1
S 1;L
and
that x
1
S;L
> !
1
S;L
  !
1
S 1;L
. Therefore,

1
S
(x) = 
1
S
(!)
 
x
1
S;L
=!
1
S;L

1=L
 
1
S
(!)
 
(!
1
S;L
  !
1
S 1;L
)=!
1
S;L

1=L
which implies

1
S
(x) + 
2
0
(!) > 1:
14
The last inequality says that the condition of individual rationality for agent
1 in state of nature S is not compatible with the condition of individual
rationality for agent 2 in state of nature 0. Because x was chosen arbitrarily
in A
!
, this implies that the strong sequential core is empty.
A transfer of commodities from agent 1 to agent 2 in state of nature
S might solve the problem. It could diminish the value of 
1
S
() and thus
weaken the condition of individual rationality for agent 1 in state of nature
S. However, the only asset that pays in state of nature S is asset J and
this asset also pays in state of nature S   1. Its payos are denominated in
units of commodity L. Given that the initial endowment !
1
S 1;L
is suciently
small, any attempt to redistribute a unit of asset J from agent 1 to agent 2
results in an allocation x that prescribes to agent 1 a negative amount x
1
S 1;L
of commodity L in state of nature S   1. However, such an allocation is
prohibited by the denition of A.
Thus, even though there is a strongly complete set of assets, there is no
way to redistribute commodities that become available to agent 1 in state of
nature S. Any allocation x that may potentially arise as a result of such a
redistribution will be outside the consumption set, and therefore is ruled out
by the denition of A. This discussion leads to a natural weakening of the
strong sequential core, discussed in the next section.
6 The Semi-strong Sequential core
We rst modify the denition of the set of constrained feasible allocations.
Denition 3
A
0
=
n
x 2 R
nSL
j
P
i2N
x
i
=
P
i2N
!
i
; x
i
  !
i
2 hAi
o
:
is the set of semi-constrained feasible allocations.
Thus, the set of semi-constrained feasible allocations contains all those allo-
cations x that may potentially arise as a result of trade in assets, even though
some of the commodity bundles specied by these allocations may lie outside
the consumption set.
Denition 4 An allocation y 2 X is an element of the semi-strong sequen-
tial core, denoted by SSC
0
(E), if
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1. y 2 C(E
0
),
2. there exists an x 2 A
0
such that y
s
2 C(E
s;
x
); s = 1; : : : S:
The semi-strong sequential core allows for the interpretation that agents
may have debts at the beginning of period 1, that is an allocation outside
the consumption set. By the end of period 1 all debts must be paid back, so
that the nal allocation y belongs to the consumption set.
Denition 4 involves an extension of the classical core to those economies
E
s;x
; whose initial endowments x do not belong to the consumption sets. To
illustrate some implications of this, dene the set of allocations feasible for
a coalition M  N in state s, given the initial allocation x 2 A
0
, as
F
s;x
(M) =
n
y
s
2
Q
i2M
X
i
s
j
P
i2M
y
i
s
=
P
i2M
x
i
s
o
:
Then the classical core of the economy E
s;x
is the set of all allocations y
s
2
F
s;x
(N) such that no M  N and y
s
2 F
s;x
(M) exist with u
i
s
(y
i
s
) > u
i
s
(y
i
s
)
for all i 2 M . If the aggregate endowment
P
i2M
x
i
s
is inconsistent with
individual consumption bundles in the respective consumption sets of the
agents of a coalition M , then the feasibility set for M is empty. In this case,
a coalition M can improve upon no allocation in the state of nature s. A
coalition can deviate, only if it is able to pay back the aggregate debt of all its
members. In particular, the conditions of individual rationality are valid only
for those agents whose initial endowments belong to the consumption sets.
It should be stressed that the extension of the classical core to a wider class
of economies does not involve the extension of the utility functions beyond
the consumption sets.
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which states the
equivalence of the classical core and the semi-strong sequential core when
there is a strongly complete set of assets. Its proof is in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3 Suppose that the economy E satises the following assumptions:
the consumption sets X
i
are convex; the utility functions u
i
s
are continuous,
concave, and strongly monotone; fy
i
2 X
i
j v
i
(y
i
)  v
i
(!
i
)g  int(X
i
); and
there is a strongly complete set of assets. Then SSC
0
(E) = C(E
0
):
The following example shows that an economy with an incomplete set of
assets may have an empty semi-strong sequential core.
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Example 4 Consider the family of economies parameterized by the agents'
endowments ! 2 
 = R
nSL
++
, in which n = 2. As before, the consumption
sets and utility functions are given by (1){(3). We assume A
S
= 0, so the
case with a strongly complete set of assets is excluded. Other entries of the
matrix A may be chosen arbitrarily. Then for all economies in some open
subset of 
 the semi-strong sequential core is empty.
The cores of the ex post-economies E
s;x
and the semi-strong sequential core
of the economy E
!
are given by
C(E
s;x
) =
n
y
s
2 R
nL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 such that
y
i
s
= t
i
!

s
; t
1
+ t
2
= 1;
t
i
 
i
s
(x); whenever x
i
s
2 R
L
++
o
and
SSC
0
(E
!
) =
n
y 2 R
nSL
++
j 9t
i
> 0 9x 2 A
0
!
; such that
y
i
= t
i
!

; t
1
+ t
2
= 1; t
i
 
i
0
(!);
t
i
 
i
s
(x); whenever x
i
s
2 R
L
++
; s = 1; : : : ; S:
o
;
respectively. Notice that the conditions of individual rationality are only
valid for those agents i whose bundle x
i
s
is strictly positive.
The requirement A
S
= 0 implies that x
S
= !
S
for any semi-constrained
feasible allocation x. Therefore, for any ! satisfying

i
S
(!) + 
j
0
(!) > 1 (i 6= j)
the semi-strong sequential core of the economy E
!
is empty.
The last inequality implies that the condition of individual rationality for
agent i in state of nature S is not compatible with the condition of individual
rationality for agent j in state of nature 0. Redistribution of commodities
from agent i to agent j in state S of the world could diminish the value of

i
S
() and thus weaken the condition of individual rationality for agent i in
state S. However, redistribution of goods that become available in state S
via trade in assets is not possible. In this way incompleteness of the set of
assets may result in the emptiness of the semi-strong sequential core.
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7 Concluding Remarks
The fact that most economic interaction takes place over time has received
very limited attention in the part of the economic literature that focuses on
cooperative solution concepts. In this paper we have studied the implica-
tions arising from the unravelling of time and uncertainty for the concept of
the core. The strong sequential core imposes an additional requirement of
time consistency on the classical core, in the sense that a strong sequential
core allocation can be achieved without any coalition having an incentive to
deviate at any point in time.
The strong sequential core highlights a stabilizing property of assets. It is
weakly increasing in the number of assets traded, and is shown to be equiv-
alent to the classical core, when all the possible contingent contracts are
present in the economy. Surprisingly, equivalence and even non-emptiness
of the strong sequential core may fail under quite stringent notions of com-
pleteness of the set of assets being traded.
The possible emptiness of the strong sequential core suggests that some
weakenings of it be considered. One is to allow for debts at the beginning of
period one, leading to the semi-strong sequential core, which is also studied
in this paper. The semi-strong sequential core coincides with the classical
core when the set of assets traded is strongly complete, but might still be
empty otherwise. Another weakening of the strong sequential core can be
obtained by requiring the blocking allocations of coalitions to be credible
in the sense that they should belong to the cores of the ex post economies
restricted to that coalition. The concept of the weak sequential core that
arises from such a requirement is studied in Predtechenski et al. (2001). In
that paper it is shown that the weak sequential core, although is a superset
of the strong sequential core, might still be empty when the set of assets is
not suciently complete.
Blending time and uncertainty therefore points at serious problems of the
core concepts, in particular when it is only possible to trade in a limited set
of contracts at the outset.
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A Appendix: Proofs
In this Appendix we provide proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a nance economy E, in which the consumption sets X
i
are closed and bounded from below, and the Bernoulli utility functions u
i
s
are
continuous and strongly monotone. Then the strong sequential core of the
economy E is a compact set.
Proof. Recall that the strong sequential core of E is given by
SSC(E) = C(E
0
) \ A:
Under the assumption that the X
i
are bounded from below, the set A of
constrained feasible allocations for the economy E is bounded. It remains to
be veried that the strong sequential core is a closed set.
Consider the sequence y
q
in SSC(E) converging to a point y
0
2 R
Sn
.
Then, since the X
i
are closed, y
0
2 A. Suppose that there is a coalition
M  N and an allocation ~y, feasible for M , such that v
i
(~y
i
) > v
i
(y
i
0
) for all
i 2M . Then, due to the continuity of v
i
, for q large enough and for all i 2M
inequalities v
i
(~y
i
) > v
i
(y
i
q
) hold true, implying that y
q
is not an element of
C(E
0
). Consequently, y
0
2 C(E
0
).
We use the following additional denitions.
  =

(!; ) 2 
 R
Jn
j !
i
+ A
i
2 R
S
++
;
P
n
i=1

i
= 0
	
; a smooth
(Sn+ Jn  J)-dimensional manifold.
 S =

z 2 R
S
++
j kzk = 1
	
; the intersection of the strictly positive
orthant with the unit sphere, a smooth (S   1)-dimensional manifold.
 S
n
; the product of n unit spheres S, a smooth n(S   1)-dimensional
manifold.
  = f(z
1
; : : : ; z
n
) 2 S
n
j z
i
= z
j
; i; j = 1; : : : ; ng ; a smooth (S   1)-
dimensional submanifold of S
n
.
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 g
i
: R
S
++
! S; a normalized gradient of the function v
i
, dened as
g
i
(y
i
) =
rv
i
(y
i
)
krv
i
(y
i
)k
; 8 y
i
2 R
S
++
: (10)
 h : ! S
n
; a function dened by
h(!; ) =
 
g
1
(!
1
+ A
1
); : : : ; g
n
(!
n
+ A
n
)

; 8 (!; ) 2 :
For a smooth manifold M; and x a point in M; T
x
(M) denotes the tangent
space to M at x:
Proof of Theorem 2.
We claim that the linear mapping
D

h() : T

()! T
h()
(S
n
)
is surjective for any  2 . To show this we only need the fact that the
linear mappings D
x
i
g
i
(x
i
) : R
S
! T
g
i
(x
i
)
(S) are surjective, which follows
immediately from the non-zero Gaussian curvature of v
i
; see Debreu (1972).
Let  = (!; ), x
i
= !
i
+ A
i
; i = 1; : : : ; n. Take any vectors dg
i
2
T
g
i
(x
i
)
(S), so that dg 2 T
h()
(S
n
). The surjectiveness of D
x
i
g
i
(x
i
) implies
that there are vectors d!
i
2 R
S
such that
D
x
i
g
i
(x
i
)d!
i
= dg
i
:
If we set d
i
all equal to zero, then d = (d!; d) 2 T

(), and
D

h()d = dg:
Since dg was chosen arbitrarily in the tangent space of S
n
, this shows the
surjectivity of the D

h().
Surjectivity of the dierential D

h() for all  2  implies that the function
h is transverse to any submanifold of S
n
. In particular, h is transverse to .
The preimage of  under h
h
 1
() =
n
(!; ) 2 
 R
Jn
j !
i
+ A
i
2 R
S
++
;
n
X
i=1

i
= 0;
g
i
(!
i
+ A
i
) = g
k
(!
k
+ A
k
) i; k = 1; : : : ; n
o
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is non-empty. Moreover, it is a smooth submanifold of , and its dimension
is given by
dimh
 1
() = dim  dimS
n
+ dim =
= (Sn+ Jn  J)  n(S   1) + (S   1) = (n  1)(J + 1) + S:
Let pr : h
 1
() ! 
 be dened by pr(!; ) = ! for all (!; ) 2 . If
J < S   1, then dimh
 1
() < dim
. By Sard's Theorem the projection of
h
 1
() into 
 has Lebesgue measure zero. Therefore, there is a set of full
measure 


 
 such that pr
 1
(!) = ; for all ! 2 


. If J = S   1, then
dimh
 1
() = dim
. In this case, there is a set of full measure 


 
 such
that for all ! 2 


the set pr
 1
(!) is a zero-dimensional manifold. Observe
that any manifold of dimension zero is a discrete set.
Under the assumptions of the theorem, the strong sequential core of the
nance economy E
!
is contained in the set
n
x 2 R
Sn
++
j
n
X
i=1
x
i
=
n
X
i=1
!
i
; x
i
  !
i
2 hAi;
g
i
(x
i
) = g
k
(x
k
); i; k = 1; : : : ; n
o
;
which is homeomorphic to pr
 1
(!). Moreover, SSC(E
!
) is a compact set.
The observation that any compact and discrete set is nite completes the
proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Let P(E
0
) and P(E
s;!
) be the sets of Pareto-ecient allocations for the
economies E
0
and E
s;!
, respectively. Theorem 3 is proved in three steps:
1. [y 2 P(E
0
)] implies [y
s
2 P(E
s;!
) for all s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg]
2. [y
s
2 P(E
s;!
) \ int(X
s
) for all s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg] implies
[9x 2 A
0
: y
s
2 C(E
s;x
) for all s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg]
3. SSC(E) = C(E
0
).
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Step 1. Suppose that there is an allocation y which is Pareto-ecient in
the economy E
0
and not Pareto-ecient in the economy E
;!
in some state
 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. Then there exists an allocation ~y

2 X

, such that
X
i2N
~y
i

=
X
i2N
!
i

u
i

(~y
i

)  u
i

(y
i

) 8 i 2 N
with some strict inequality. Dene the allocation by as follows:
by
i
s
=
(
~y
i

if s = ;
y
i
s
otherwise:
Then allocation by is feasible in the economy E
0
, and
v
i
(by
i
)  v
i
(y
i
) 8 i 2 N
with some strict inequality, contradicting the fact that y is Pareto-ecient
in the state zero economy.
Step 2. Take an allocation y such that y
s
2 P(E
s;!
) \ int(X
s
) for all s 2
f1; : : : ; Sg. Under the assumptions of the theorem, the Second Welfare the-
orem implies that there exist vectors of commodity prices p
s
2 R
L
++
such
that (y
s
; p
s
) is an equilibrium with transfers of the economy E
s;!
: Let the
distribution of wealth in this equilibrium be given by (w
1
s
; : : : ; w
n
s
).
Under the assumption of a strongly complete set of assets, the system of
equations
0
B
@
w
i
1
.
.
.
w
i
S
1
C
A
=
0
B
@
p
1
!
i
1
.
.
.
p
S
!
i
S
1
C
A
+
0
B
@
p
1
A
1
.
.
.
p
S
A
S
1
C
A

i
has a solution with respect to 
i
for all i 2 N . Denote this solution by 
i
and let x
i
= !
i
+ A
i
: It is obvious that x 2 A
0
.
Since p
s
x
i
s
= w
i
s
for all i 2 N , (y
s
; p
s
) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy E
s;x
(of the state s economy with initial allocation x). The obser-
vation that any equilibrium allocation of the economy E
s;x
is an element of
the classical core of this economy completes Step 2.
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Step 3. Take allocation y in C(E
0
), arbitrarily. Then the conditions of
individual rationality, v
i
(y
i
)  v
i
(!
i
), imply that y
i
2 int(X
i
). Moreover,
y is Pareto-optimal in the economy E
0
. Steps 1 and 2 then imply that y
is an element of the semi-strong sequential core. This completes the proof
since it follows readily from the denition of the strong sequential core that
SSC(E)  C(E
0
):
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